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INCOME TAXATION, WEALTH EFFECTS, AND UNCERTAINTY:
PORTFOLIO ADJUSTMENTS WITH
ISOELASTIC UTILITY AND DISCRETE PROBABILITY (v.2)†
Theodore S. Sims*
(© 2014)
The expected utility formulation of the problem of a risk-averse agent’s allocating a port-
folio between a safe and a risky asset is widely taken as standing for the proposition that
if a* is the optimal holding of the risky asset in the absence of tax, a*/(1-t) is the optimal
allocation in the presence of a proportional tax at rate t, a finding obtained on the assump-
tion that the return r to the riskless asset is (or is taxed as though it were) zero. In this
paper I model the agent as exhibiting constant relative risk aversion and the probability
distribution of the risky asset as binomial, and take r to be greater than zero. With those
assumptions the solution a* depends on the all the parameters of the problem. The key
finding of the paper, however, is that the optimal adjustment to taxation does not. But
it differs from a*/(1-t). It depends on r, as well as t, and reflects in a natural way the
response of the agent to the wealth effect of taxation.
Keywords: Taxation and risk; uncertainty; portfolio choice; cash-flow taxation; income
taxation.
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† AUTHOR’S NOTE: The original expected utility formulations of the Domar-Musgrave problem
by Mossin (1968) and Stiglitz (1969) differ in how they model the agent’s end-of-period wealth,
Mossin modelling as the choice variable the amount (a) invested in the risky asset, Stiglitz
modelling it as the share (α). This working paper describes prior work using the partial dif-
ferential equation that emerges from Mossin’s formulation, as did an earlier version (v.1, BUSLWP
No. 14-23, revised July 15, 2014), but which itself modelled the choice variable as the share. The
current version (v.2) follows Mossin in modelling the choice variable as the amount. The solution
here (a*) differs slightly from the solution (α*) in v.1. The optimal adjustment to taxation, how-
ever, does not. Furthermore, a brief appendix to this version shows that the form of the solution
obtained here satisfies the partial differential equation in Mossin.

1. INTRODUCTION
Domar & Musgrave’s classic (1944) paper explored the impact of a proportional tax on
capital income on the optimal allocation of a portfolio between a safe and a risky asset. They
concluded that such a tax would typically increase aggregate (social) risk-taking, including that
portion assumed by the government through taxation of the returns from and allowance of deduc-
tions for losses on risky investments. The subsequent reformulation of the problem using expect-
ed utility by Mossin (1968), Stiglitz (1969), and Sandmo (1977), yields the insight that if the risk
free rate of return r (or tax on that return) is zero, then for any risk-averse actor the optimal
holding of the risky asset in the presence of tax at rate t is a*/(1-t), where a* is the optimal
holding of the risky asset in the absence of tax. With that "gross-up" adjustment the agent
restores after tax his original (pre-tax) portfolio risk; and, in the absence of offsetting action by
the government, social risk-taking is increased. See Sandmo (1985) and Poterba (2002) for
surveys.
For Domar & Musgrave (and subsequently Tobin (1958)), the assumption r = 0 was a nat-
ural byproduct of the fact that they took the riskless asset to be cash. Even though that is not
generally an innocuous assumption -- in effect it allows the agent costlessly to recover after-tax
their original pre-tax holding of the risky asset -- the strikingly simple adjustment it induces has
been influential, leading a generation of legal analysts (and more than a few public finance econ-
omists) to conclude that an income tax effectively does not (and cannot) tax returns to risk, and
so is equivalent to a tax levied on the risk free return to capital;1 and from that to infer that the
1 This insight is often and incorrectly attributed to Domar & Musgrave themselves. It appears to have
originated with Warren (1980, 1996) with an influential extension by Kaplow (1991, 1994). See Sims (2013)
for a critical survey. The foundation for the insight is simple: Suppose that the returns to the risky and risk-
less asset are R˜ and r, respectively, and that the optimal allocation to the risky asset in the absence of tax is
α*, so that the return to the optimal portfolio in the absence of tax is α*R˜ + (1-α*)r. If, in the presence of tax
at rate t, the allocation to the risky asset is adjusted to α*/(1-t), then the after-tax portfolio return is
equivalent to the (pre-tax) return to the original portfolio, reduced by tax on the return to the riskless asset as
though earned on the entire portfolio. The effect, however, is implicit: what appears as a restoration to the
after-tax portfolio of the pre-tax return on (and risk of) the risky asset is accomplished by enlarging the pre-tax
holding of that asset. Hence, nominal private pre-tax risk-taking increases, as (through taxation) does social
risk-taking, unless and except to the extent that the government engages in offsetting conduct of the sort essent-
ial to the conclusions of Kaplow (1991, 1994).
difference between income and cash flow taxation is just tax on the risk free return. While the
first of those two propositions requires only that economic agents exhibit risk tolerance that is
consistent under the two alternative systems, the second requires that they respond to an income
tax by adjusting their portfolio composition exactly as indicated above.2
These insights were obtained, however, only by putting aside the possible wealth effects
of capital income taxation on the tolerance for risk. In the expected utility setting, when the
assumption r = 0 is relaxed, the optimal holding of the risky asset is no longer a*/(1-t), but is
instead defined (see Mossin) by
(1)
where W is wealth and ∂a/∂W is the wealth derivative of the risky asset. Setting r = 0 recovers
the basic insight of Mossin and Stiglitz; when r ≠ 0 the optimal holding is a*/(1-t) only if ∂a*/∂W
= 0, that is, the optimal holding is independent of wealth. When neither is 0, however, Mossin
and Stiglitz were unable to obtain a solution to (1). They were, however, able indirectly to draw
inferences about the properties of a*, suggesting, consistent with Domar & Musgrave’s original
findings, that the presence of a proportional income tax plausibly would lead agents to enlarge
their holdings of the risky asset, thereby increasing aggregate social risk, but to something less
than a*/(1-t).
2. DESIGN
This paper takes a different approach, imposing additional structure on the problem by
parameterizing the agent’s preferences as isoelastic (constant relative risk aversion, or CRRA)
and the probability distribution as binomial. Although these assumptions are restrictive, the
former is consistent with widely held priors about attitudes towards risk. Even with those
2 Under a cash-flow tax, which allows investments to be expensed, the tax savings from expensing would
enable the agent simultaneously to gross up their holdings of both the risky and the riskless asset, financing
the enlargements out of the tax savings from expensing. Then the after-tax portfolio return would be
so that the entire portfolio is effectively tax exempt, and the apparent difference between income taxation (see
footnote 1) and cash-flow taxation is then just -rt. The result is obtained, however, only if in response to
income taxation the agent adjusts their optimal holding to α*/(1-t).
2
assumptions, moreover, the optimal holding of the risky asset in the absence of tax depends on
all the parameters. What is unexpected and striking, however, is that the adjustments to taxation
do not. The departure from a simple gross-up turns out to be independent of both the probability
distribution of the risky asset and the parameters of the utility function. With binomial probabil-
ity the optimal adjustment to taxation by an actor with CRRA preferences depends only on r and
t, in a manner that reflects in a natural way the impact of income taxation on wealth.
3. ANALYSIS
To see this, write terminal wealth as
(Wˆ)
where a is the amount invested in the risky asset, X˜ is distributed according to
(X˜)
and utility is isoelastic
(U(W˜))
so that expected utility is
(EU(W˜))
Then the first order condition for expected utility maximization is
(F1)
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(after eliminating (1-t) from both terms), or
(F2)
since E[X˜] > r. Writing
(Κ)
and exponentiating (F2) gives
and on expanding WL and WH and solving for a
* yields
(a*)
where in the last two versions the factors in braces involving Κ in the numerator and
denominator of the initial version have for convenience been denoted ΚN and ΚˆD
3.
Since the solution a* emerges from a specialization of the problem as formulated by Mos-
sin, we would expect it to satisfy (1). That it does is verified in the appendix. Observe also that
as a general matter a* depends on all the parameters of the problem, r, γ, t, W0, and the probabil-
ity distribution of X˜. But the key feature of the solution here is that the adjustments of the
optimal holdings in response to taxation do not. Note, first, that since t does not enter into Κ
(or ΚN or ΚˆD), then for r = 0 (constraining XL < 0) the optimal holding a
* under a proportional
tax is just the non-taxable optimal holding divided by (1-t), replicating the findings of Mossin
and Stiglitz. Next, the optimal holding in a no-tax world with r > 0 is given by evaluating a*
at t = 0, and its grossed-up counterpart is simply that divided by (1-t):
3 The factor in the denominator has been denoted ΚˆD to distinguish it from ΚD in v.1 of this working
paper (No. 14-23), where the problem was modelled using as the choice variable the share invested in X˜, as
a result of which the solution (there α*) took a slightly different form.
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From this, on dividing the optimized after-tax holding a* by the grossed-up optimized pre-tax
holding it follows that
(Ra*)
So we have the following:
THEOREM: If utility is isoelastic, then for any γ and W0 and a risky asset distrib-
uted according to a binomial probability satisfying X˜, the ratio of the optimized
after-tax holding to the grossed-up optimized pre-tax holding is given by Ra* < 1,
and depends only on r and t
4. IMPLICATION
The ratio Ra* is simply the percentage reduction due to taxation of the yield to the riskless
asset, and can be viewed as a natural measure of the wealth effect on the portfolio of proportional
taxation. It induces a departure from the adjustment that has been widely deployed to
characterize the effects of taxation as equivalent (implicitly) to exempting from tax the returns
to risk. With the adjustment given by Ra*, the after-tax return to the portfolio as optimized in
response to taxation (see footnote 1) is given by
so that the allocation to the risky asset is effectively reduced, and, compared to the pre-tax
portfolio, after-tax returns are reduced by more than just a tax as though levied on the riskless
return. As such, the conclusion reached here crystallizes the notion that the income tax is (even
implicitly) more than just a tax confined to the riskless return. More importantly, it contradicts
the stronger claim, premised on the belief that the optimal adjustment to income taxation is to
enlarge a* to a*/(1-t), that an income tax differs from a cash-flow tax only by taxation of the
riskless return.
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APPENDIX
In Mossin’s (1968) formulation, the after-tax optimal allocation satisfies the partial
differential equation
(1)
so that we should expect the solution (a*) to satisfy (1).
Dividing a* by (1-t) yields
(1a)
Differentiating a* with respect to W0 gives
(1b)
and multiplying that by rW0/[1+r(1-t)] produces
(1c)
So the right-hand side of (1) is
On the other hand, differentiating a* with respect to t produces
Hence, (a*) satisfies (1).
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